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Fries: Fries: Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code

Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy

Code-A Politically Motivated Less
Fresh Start?
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy is that honest debtors should be
given a fresh start by relieving them of the burden of their debts.' There are
those who believe, however, that this principle is abused by debtors who
should not be entitled to the benefit of a discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. As a result, Congress has recently acted to eliminate some of the
benefits received by certain debtors who file bankruptcy.
These congressional changes in the bankruptcy law: a) eliminate the
dischargeability of student loans in Chapter 13 proceedings; b) expand the
exception to discharge for drunk driving debts to include those arising from
driving while under the influence of drugs; c) expand the exception to
discharge for drunk and drugged driving to include Chapter 13 filings; d)
eliminate the dischargeability of criminal restitution orders in Chapter 13; and
e) severely restrict the discharge of debts incurred in operating a federally
insured financial institution.
These changes are significant not only for the limitations they impose,
but also for what they signal. Before enacting these changes, Congress did
not undertake an analysis of bankruptcy law, nor did it even enact these
changes as a package. Rather, it incorporated them into different bills that
were dealing with other issues. It is important, and unlikely a coincidence,
that all three areas of reform--student loans, drunk driving, and savings and
loan scandals--are highly visible on the front pages of today's newspapers and
in the lead stories of today's television newscasts. The changes appear to be
politically motivated changes to the bankruptcy laws, and signal that Congress
may change the bankruptcy laws whenever it is politically beneficial to do so.
These changes may provide a prelude to future changes in the bankruptcy
laws, which may be very significant in today's fluctuating economy. Personal
bankruptcies are increasing, up 16 percent in 1990.2 This increase is the

1. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
2. Kansas City Star, Mar. 7, 1991, at B2, col. 1. Additionally, bankruptcies
increased 21 percent for the twelve months ended June 30, 1991, from a year earlier.
Kansas City Star, Sept. 5, 1991, at B8, col. 1.
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sharpest since 1986, when filings increased 31 percent
Further, 4an
additional increase in filings may occur as the threat of a recession looms.
At a minimum, ihe bankruptcy changes will further lessen the popularity
of Chapter 13 filings. Now two debts that used to be dischargeable in
Chapter 13, student loans and drunk driving judgments, are no longer treated
differently in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7 proceedings. These changes,
coupled with the alleged failure of Chapter 13,6 may influence debtors to file
Chapter 7 and receive a full discharge of their debts.7 There is no longer a
"head start" to be gained by filing Chapter 13, but simply the same "fresh
start" as Chapter 7.8
Individuals who are contemplating bankruptcy because of debts incurred
in operating a federally insured financial institution may also be discouraged
from filing bankruptcy. These debts are simply not dischargeable. Most
importantly, property that would otherwise qualify for an exemption in a
bankruptcy proceeding is not beyond the reach of creditors holding the debts
incurred in operating a financial institution.
Overall, the bankruptcy laws are no longer as forgiving to debtors as they
once were. Further, Congress was less forgiving to the most popular abusers

3. Kansas City Star, Mar. 7, 1991, at B2, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1991, at D2, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1991,
at Al, col. 1, but c.f. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1991, at 12WC1, col. 1 (practitioner
postulating that bankruptcies will decrease in recession because fewer people will start
new businesses).
5. T.

SULLIVAN,

E.

WARREN & J.:WESTBROOK,

As WE

FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS

213-24 (1989) (showing empirical research indicating that Chapter 13 was not working
prior to these amendments). The authors concluded that their data showed the
following:
Debtors in Chapter 13 fail at extraordinary rates, with fewer than a third
still making payments an average of two years after confirmation. On
average, those who are paying have proposed plans that promise to pay only
about half their debts. This is not surprising, considering how little they
have. And some might say that a debtor who repays something isbetter
than a debtor who does not. But with plans paying considerably less than
100%, it is not possible to know whether Chapter 13's pay creditors more
than Chapter 7's.
Id. at 222.
6. Id.
7. It is possible, however, that this "carrot and stick" approach has no impact on
what chapter a debtor chooses to file bankruptcy under. See id. at 230-56.
8. There are, however, still some debts that are dischargeable in Chapter 13 but
not dischargeable in Chapter 7. Examples are debts incurred as a result of willful and
malicious injury, loans obtained by fraud, and debts arising from embezzlement. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 1328, 523(a) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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of the bankruptcy laws: former students who used student loans to finance
their education; drunk and drugged drivers; and savings and loan bandits.

II. STUDENT LOAN DEBTS
Congress removed one incentive to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy when it

made student loan debts nondischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings. This
enactment was not part of any bankruptcy or judicial bill, but rather part of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.' Congress' amendment
adds student loans to alimony and child support payments as nondischargeable

debts in Chapter 13 under section 1328(a).1°
The amendment affects any Chapter 13 bankruptcy case filed after
November 5, 1990."

By amending section 1328(a), which is the Chapter 13 general discharge
provision, to include those debts falling within paragraph 8 of section 523(a)
as nondischargeable, Congress made student loans in Chapter 13 subject to the
same treatment they receive in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 2 This treatment
would have meant that student loans could only be discharged if: (i) they first

9. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (1990) (the short title for the section amending the bankruptcy code is entitled
"Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act of 1990," id. § 3001 [hereinafter
Student Loan Act]).
10. Id. § 3007(b)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2)). The wording used
is as follows:
(b)TREATMENT OF CERTAIN EDUCATION LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.---(l) Section 1328(a)(2) of title 11, United States
Code, is amended by striking "section 523(a)(5)" and inserting "paragraph
(5) or (8) of section 523(a)."
Id.

One court has noted, however, that the public policy of student loan repayment is
not as strong as the payment of child support and alimony payments. In re Scheiber,
No. 4-91-2496 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 1, 1991) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, Bankr.).
11. Student Loan Act, supra note 9, § 3007(b)(2). The wording used in the
amendment is as follows:
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall not apply to any case
under the provisions of title 11, United States Code, commenced before the
date of enactment of this Act.
Id. The amendment was enacted November 5, 1990. Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).

12. See, e.g., In re Patronek, 121 Bankr. 728, 729 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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became due five years before the date of filing the bankruptcy petition; 13 or
(ii) the debtor would otherwise experience undue hardship. 4
Just twenty-four days later, and in a different bill, the terms of section
523(a)(8) were changed.15 The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of
199016 amended the section. The section previously disallowed a discharge
of any debt:
for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental
unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of
any applicable suspension of the repayment plan) before the date
of the filing of the petition .... 17
The amended section 523(a)(8) does not allow a discharge of a debt:
for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, guaranteed
by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in
part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to
repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend,
unless(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first
became due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable
suspension of the repayment period) before the date of filing of
the petition .... 18
This amendment clarifies that student loans are exempted from discharge
if they are benefit overpayments, loans from the government, or loans from

13. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1988), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 3621, 104 Stat. 4965 (1990).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1988).
15. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621, 104 Stat. 4964 (1990).
16. Id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988) amended by Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 3621, 104
Stat. 4964 (1990).
18. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621, 104 Stat. 4964,
4965 (1990) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). The change in the statute was
not intended to affect the discharge of student loans administered by federal agencies
that have their own statutory regulation (e.g. Public Health Service Act). The intent
was to "cover only those debts which are now covered by section 523(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code, rather than by these more specific statutes." The specific statutes
still govern the dischargeability of their respective student loans. 136 CONG. REC.
H13,288-02 (daily ed. October 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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programs funded by the government or nonprofit organizations.' 9 The
amendment also expands the current limitation period from five to seven
years.2" The amendment, however, did not alter the exception to the
21
nondischarge of student loans if an undue hardship would result.
Previously, the five-year provision meant that student loans could be
discharged if the first installment payment became due five years or more
before the bankruptcy petition was filed. This same reasoning should apply
to the new seven-year time limitation. Congress made no attempt to provide
otherwise. Additionally, this seven-year period will also now apply to student
loan .debts in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.' A possible reason for the time
expansion is simply to give the government two more years to catch up with
debtors who have defaulted on their student loans.
Student loans can also be discharged in Chapter 7, and now in Chapter
13, if not discharging the debt would "impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor's dependents., 24 Courts have not been anxious to grant a
discharge for student loans under this exception. The debtor's situation must
be practically hopeless; the mere inability to pay currently or in the immediate
future is not enough to receive discharge by hardship. 25 One federal circuit
court of appeals has put forth a three part test for a debtor to qualify for
"undue hardship." The test requires:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses,
a 'minimal' standard of living for herself or and her dependents if forced
to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that
this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
repayment period or the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made
good faith efforts to repay the loans. 26
This strict test will likely be incorporated as the standard for Chapter 13
discharges of student loans, and it could have ramifications beyond the plain
language of the amendment.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1988).
22. In re Nunn, 788 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1986).
23. Student Loan Act, supra note 9, § 3007(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a)(2)).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1988). This exception was retained in the
amendments. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621, 104 Stat.
at 4965 (amending only paragraph (A) of 11 U.S.C. § 578).
25. E.g., In re Briscoe, 16 Bankr. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
26. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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One of the few courts to discuss the nondischargeability of student loans
since the amendments were enacted suggested that it will reevaluate its
standard of determining "undue hardship" under section 523(a)(8)(B).27 In
that jurisdiction the court had developed a very strict test for "undue
hardship." The test required a preliminary finding that the debtor's income
was below the poverty level before the court would even consider other
factors. s This strict test was based on the availability of a complete
discharge of student loans in Chapter 13.29 Now that the Chapter 13
discharge is not a possibility, courts may reevaluate the undue hardship
requirement and possibly make the requirement less stringent."
The unanswered question, particularly for people with large student loan
debts who were contemplating filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, is
"WHY?". The answer is not clear. The legislative history of the student loan
amendments is minimal. A possible reason for extending the nondischargeability of student loans to Chapter" 13 is that student loans, and defaults on
them, are popular political topics. 31 The delinquency rate for student loans
is increasing and is a great concern in Congress and the press.
This
increase in student loan delinquencies is an anomaly; people using student
loans to fund advanced education are some of the country's best educated
people, and they are unable, or unwilling, to pay off their debts. Although
Congress did not act with any statistical study or report at hand, the message
is clear from its action: If you receive an education at the government's
expense, you are not going to avoid repaying the loan to the government.
The timing of these amendments is particularly interesting. The changes
come when tuition is rapidly increasing and student loans are becoming an
ever more necessary and popular way of financing an education. According
to the Department of Education, the number of student borrowers has "nearly
doubled to 4.5 million in the fiscal year ended last September from a decade
earlier, and the amount borrowed, adjusted for inflation, rose 61% to $12.35
billion."33 Defaults last year totalled $2.4 billion,34 and are expected to
increase if a recession occurs. 5 With the fear of a recession, Congress is

27. In re Patronek, 121 Bankr. 728, 729 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).

28.
29.
30.
31.

In re Bryant, 72 Bankr. 913, 917-18 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
Id. at 917.
Patronek, 121 Bankr. at 729 n.1.
E.g. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1990, at 9, col. 1.

32. E.g. Coleman, Student Loan Defaults Total $2 Billion a Year, ROLL

CALL,

March 18, 1991; Van Nostrand, U.S. Student Loan ProgramBuried by Mountain of
Debt, Newsday, Dec. 31, 1990, at 24.

33. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1991, at B1,col. 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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concerned with a general increase in delinquencies of all debt owed to the
federal government. 36 Of these delinquencies, student loan debts are no
exception to congressional concern.37 With the mounting government debt,
Congress may simply be looking to decrease delinquencies and defaults on
government loans, particularly those loans whose default rates are popular
political topics.
At the same time it made the amendment preventing the discharge of
student loans in Chapter 13, Congress also altered the treatment of the
institutions making student loans. The automatic stay statute and the
property of the estate statute " were amended. 40 The automatic stay statute

36. See

DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE DEBT COLLECTION: SO MANY INTENTIONS SO

LrrITLE MONEY, H.R. Rep. No. 825, -101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).

37. Id- at 7.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
40. Student Loan Act, supra note 9, § 3007(a) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)). The relevant text of the statute is as follows:
(a) AUTOMATIC STAY AND PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE.
(1) Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended(C) by inserting immediately following paragraph (13) the
following new paragraphs:
"(14) under subsection (a) of this section, of any
action by an accrediting agency regarding the accreditation status of the debtor as an educational institution;
"(15) under subsection (a) of this section, of any
action by a State licensing body regarding the licensure of the debtor as an educational institution; or
"(16) under subsection (a) of this section, of any
action by a guaranty agency, as defined in section
4350) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) or the Secretary of Education
regarding the eligibility of the debtor to participate in
programs authorized under such Act.".
(2) Section 541(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
...[by adding]:
"(3) any eligibility of the debtor to participate in
programs authorized under the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2751 et
seq.), or any accreditation status or State licensure of
the debtor as an educational institution.".
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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was amended so that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as
a stay, and thereby a prevention, of any action by an agency determining the
institution's eligibility to participate in student loan programs. 4' Congress
also made a conforming amendment to the property of the estate section. This
amendment provides that the bankruptcy estate does not include any property
rights in the eligibility of the debtor to participate in guaranteed student loan
programs or in an accreditation status as an educational institution.42 As a
result, the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not protect an educational
institution from inspection by entities involved in guaranteeing student loans.
These amendments were enacted to protect the federal government's from
abuses and losses by institutions involved in guaranteed student loan
programs. 43 These concerns are great considering the increased bankruptcy
of educational institutions, particularly smaller schools and trade schools."
Congress made these bankruptcy amendments, except for the seven year
extension, subject to a sunset provision. The amendments cease to be
effective on October 1, 1996. 45 Apparently Congress wants to force itself to
reevaluate the amendments at that time. Congress also ordered the Comptroller General to prepare a report analyzing discharges of student loans in
bankruptcy. The study is to provide an in-depth analysis of student loan

The amendments to section 362(b) reflect careless drafting. See infra note 54.
The amendment adds paragraph (14) to section 362(b). Paragraph (14), however, had
already been added earlier in 1990. Bankruptcy: Swap Agreements and Forward
Contracts, Pub. L. No. 101-311 § 102, 104 Stat. 267 (1990) (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(14) (discussing treatment of swap agreements and forward contracts
in bankruptcy proceedings). As a result, section 362(b) now apparently has two
paragraphs numbered "(14)." It is unlikely Congress meant to replace the previously
enacted paragraph (14) since it made no mention of it and the two paragraphs discuss
distinct issues. More likely, the drafters of the later amendment (the educational
institution amendment) were simply not aware of the prior amendment.
41. Student Loan Act, supra note 8, § 3007(a) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)).
42. Id.
43. 136 CONG. REC. S5400 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (exhibit 1, attachment 1, to
statement by Sen. Graham) argues the following:
The large number of banks, state agencies, and schools participating in
guaranteed student loan programs coupled with poor systems to protect the
federal government's financial interest creates the potential for significant
abuses and losses. A high proportion of defaults and publicized abuse by
certain proprietary schools suggest the need for improved program controls.
Id.
44. See, e.g., Moore, TradeSchools Could Be Hurt by Student Loan Crackdown,
ST. Louis Bus. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at 6A.
45. Student Loan Act, supra note 9, § 3008.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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debtors under Chapter 13 and how they compare to other debtors.'
The
report is due in 1993."7 Presumably Congress will use this report to evaluate
whether the amendments should be reenacted after the sunset provision calls
for their termination.
III. INTOXICATED OR IMPAIRED DRIVING
Legislation was also enacted that stiffened the treatment of debtors in
bankruptcy who have debts arising from drunken or drugged driving. The
purpose of the changes is to protect victims of crimes; the law is known as the
"Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990.""s The law became effective on

46. 136 CONG. REc. H5705 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 1990) (clerk reading bill) recites
the following study:
Sec. 517. STUDY OF DISCHARGE OF STAFFORD STUDENT LOANS
IN BANKRUPTCY.
(a)
STAFFORD STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE STUDY.- The
Comptroller General shall conduct a study relating to the discharge of
student loan indebtedness in proceedings in bankruptcy. Such study shall
include(1) an evaluation of the treatment of student loan debtors under
chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, including(A) the frequency of attempts to discharge or the
discharging of such loans compared to such attempts
to discharge or the discharging of other consumer
loans by such students; and
(B) the number and amount of such loans discharged;
(2) an evaluation of the effect of students who attempt to or do
discharge such loans relative to the costs of the Stafford Student
Loan Program and the institutional costs of the Perkins Loans
Program; and
(3) an evaluation of the behavior of student loan debtors who
discharge such loans as compared to other debtors who discharge
debts in bankruptcy by evaluating such factors as(A) the average age of the debtors in each group;
(B) the amounts and types of debts sought to be
discharged by each group; and
(C) the percentage of discharge of other types of
consumer debts by each group.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 1, 104 Stat.
2865 (1990) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101) [hereinafter Victims Act].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 5

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

November 15, 1990, and applies to any bankruptcy proceedings commenced
after that date.49
The law amends the exception to discharge for debts arising from
,drunken driving, which appears in section 523(a)(9). "50 Formerly, the
exception precluded discharge of a debt that arose
from a judgment or consent decree entered in a court of record against the
debtor wherein liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of the
debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated under the
laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within the United States or its
territories wherein such motor vehicle was operated and within which such
liability was incurred. 51
The amended section 523(a)(9) prohibits a discharge of any debt "for death
or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle if such
operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol,
52
a drug, or another substance.
These amendments affect Chapter 7 bankruptcies and expand the
exception to discharge to Chapter 13 filings as well.53 Apparently debts
arising from drunken driving were never supposed to be exempt from
discharge in Chapter 7 but dischargeable in Chapter 13. The published Senate

49. Id. § 4, 104 Stat. at 2865-66 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988).
51. Id.
52. Victims Act, supra note 48, § 2(a), 104 Stat. at 2865 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)).
53. Id. § 2(b), 104 Stat. at 2865 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2)). The
law amended 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2), which is the exception to discharge clause in

Chapter 13, to include the amended section 523(a)(9), thereby also exempting debts
arising from drunken and drugged driving from Chapter 13 proceedings. Victims Act,
supra note 48, § 2(a), 104 Stat. at 2865. This points out an example of the lack of
cohesiveness in enacting these amendments. See supra note 40. In the student loan
provisions, section 1328(a)(2) was amended "by striking 'section 523(a)(5)' and
inserting 'paragraph (5) or (8) of section 523(a)."' Student Loan Act, supra note 9,
§ 3007(b). In the drunk driving provisions, section 1328(a)(2) was amended "by
inserting 'or 523(a)(9)' after '523(a)(5)."' Victims Act, supra note 48, § 2, 104 Stat.
at 2865. Taken literally, since the student loan amendment was enacted November 5,
1990, and the drunk driving amendment was enacted November 15, 1990, section
1328(a)(2) would not be readable. After the student loan amendment it would read as
"of the kind specified in paragraph (5) or (8) of section 523(a) of this title." There is,
however, no "523(a)(5)" to insert the "523(a)(9)" after. It is likely that Congress
intended section 1328(a)(2) to include paragraphs (5), (8), and (9) of section 523(a).
This oversight, though, reflects the lack of planning that went into enacting these
amendments.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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Report discussing the recent amendments states that the bankruptcy amendments in 1984 s" making drunken driving debts nondischargeable were
intended to include Chapter 13 as well as Chapter 7 discharges. s The
Senate Report, in keeping with the theme of victim protection, explained that
[b]ankruptcy laws have historically given the honest and financially
distressed debtor a fresh start. However, those victimized by drunk or
drugged drivers will never have a fresh start, and therefore, drivers found

liable in a civil court should not be granted a fresh start until sufficient
reparations are made to the innocent victim or the surviving family.56
In addition to the expansion of this provision to Chapter 13, the
amendments have two significant ramifications. First, drivers impaired by
drugs other than alcohol are included within section 523(a)(9), and are thereby
57
precluded from discharging debts that arise from driving while impaired
Second, victims of drunken or drugged drivers are no longer impeded by what
'has been termed the "race to courthouse." 58 Each of these ramifications is
discussed below.
The previous wording of section 523(a)(9) prevented only a discharge for
debts arising from "intoxicated" driving.5 9 "Intoxication" was commonly
defined as being drunk or inebriated.6 Section three of the new bill, by
defining intoxication as both alcohol and drug induced, eliminates any
ambiguity of whether a debt resulting from drug induced impairment is an
exception to discharge. Such a debt is now clearly excepted from discharge.
What is a debt incurred from the operation of a motor vehicle where the
"operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using
alcohol, a drug, or another substance"? 6 A strict construction of the statute
indicates that the "operation" itself must have been unlawful, and not the
induced drug or substance that resulted in the illegal operation. This reading
is in accord with the new law's Senate legislative history which states that the

54. This was an amendment to section 523(a)(9) that was proposed by Senator
Danforth of Missouri that was enacted as Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353-54 (1984).
S. REP.
ADMIN.
55.
56.

No. 434, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEws, 4065, 4065.
Id. at 4-5, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 4067-69.
Id. at 5, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 4069.

57. Id. at 5, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 4068.
58. Id. at 5, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 4068.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988) (prior to amendment of Criminal Victims
Protection Act of 1990).
60. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1302 (2d ed. 1934).

61. Victims Act, supra note 48, § 2(a), 104 Stat. at 2865 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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"term 'drugs' includes both controlled substances and other drugs which may
render a driver impaired or intoxicated."'62 For example, drivers who
ingested a prescription drug, such as valium, that rendered them unable to
operate a motor vehicle in a lawful manner would be treated the same as
drivers whose operation of the vehicle was unlawful because they ingested
cocaine or marijuana. The question of whether the driver was "impaired or
intoxicated is one for the State or Federal trial court and not within the scope
of review of the bankruptcy court."63 This conclusion suggests there must
be a prior judgment against, the debtor based on state or federal law finding

that the debtor operated the vehicle in an unlawful manner.
In Missouri, unlawful operation of a motor vehicle occurs when a person
fails to operate a vehicle in a careful and prudent manner, or operates the
vehicle at a speed that endangers the life or property of any person, or fails
to exercise the highest degree of care.6 If that unlawful operation is caused
by the ingestion of alcohol or drugs, a judgment resulting from the unlawful
operation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Another reading of the statute, however, would require the debtor
to be
found guilty of "operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated." This requirement could be a higher standard than failing to operate the vehicle in a careful
and prudent manner. In Missouri, intoxicated driving occurs when the driver
"operates a motor vehicle in an intoxicated or drugged condition."65 Because
Missouri had already included "drugged" within the definition of intoxicated,
the new amendment would not have a significant effect under this reading.
In addition, the amendment addresses a timing problem that resulted from
the requirement that an injured party obtain a prior judgment before a debt for
drunken or drugged driving becomes nondischargeable. Section 523(a)(9)
required that the "debt arise from a judgment or consent decree.",6
Some
courts interpreted this to mean that for the debt to be nondischargeable in
bankruptcy, the victim must have reduced her damages claim to a judgment
before the driver filed a bankruptcy petition. This interpretation allowed the
debtor-driver to avoid paying damages to his victim by filing bankruptcy
before the creditor-victim could receive a judgment for his damages resulting
from the drunk driving.67 The amendment addresses this problem by

62. S. REP. No. 434, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1991 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4071, 4071.

63. Id.

64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.010.1 (Supp. 1990).
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.010 (1986).

66. S. REP. No. 434, 101st. Cong., 2d. Sess. 6, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
4065, 4069 [hereinafter Amendment].
67. Id. (citing General Accident Ins. Co. v. Cain (In re Cain), 96 Bankr. 115
(N.D. Ohio 1988); City of Akron v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 Bankr. 120 (N.D.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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eliminating the "race to the courthouse," which resulted from courts interpreting the former language of section 523(a)(9).
Although the race to the courthouse was eliminated in earlier versions of
the bill by exempting these debts from the automatic stay,6 this provision
did not become part of the final version of the bill that became law.
Presumably the drafters' intent to prevent a race to the courthouse was carried
out by deleting from section 523(a)(9) the wording "from a judgment or
consent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor" that was used
in the prior section. This wording was what courts relied on when interpreting
the previous section 523(a)(9) as requiring the damage claim be reduced to a
judgment prior to the debtor's bankruptcy.69
The published Senate Report makes it clear that the race to the courthouse does not exist any longer. Senator Biden stated to the Senate just prior
to the passage of the current version of the bill that "although the technical
bankruptcy mechanism for addressing the race to the courthouse problem has

been changed, the intended effect of the original legislation remains un7

changed. 0 The elimination of the race to the courthouse is further evidenced by the published Senate Report, which expressly adopted7' the
conclusion put forth by the Ninth Circuit in In re Hudson72 that the purpose
of section 523(a)(9) is "(1) to deter drunk driving; (2) to ensure that those who
caused injury by driving drunk did not escape civil liability through the
bankruptcy laws; and (3) to protect victims of drunk driving." 73 The purpose
of the change in the wording of section 523(a)(9) was "to prevent 'drunk' or
'drugged' drivers from escaping payment of civil judgments to their victims
by filing for bankruptcy. 74 Now debtors will not be able to

Ohio 1987)).
68. 136 CONG. REC. S13,390-02 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (clerk reading S.
1931). Section 362(b) was to be changed by adding a new paragraph that prevented
the automatic stay from operating in cases of drunk driving under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(9).
69. Amendment, supra note 66, at 6, 1990 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS

4065, 4069.
70. 136 CONG. REC. S17,654-01 (daily ed. October 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
71. Amendment, supra note 66, at 6, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 4065, 4069.
72. 859 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1988).
73. Amendment, supra note 66, at 6. 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

4065, 4069 (citing Hudson, 859 F.2d at 1423).
74. Amendment, supra note 66, at 6, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4065, 4065.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

discharge a civil judgment related to damages caused as a result of driving
a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol
or drugs ....[This] will force drunk or drugged drivers to pay on their
civil judgments, and will provide victims or their families with a measure
of compensation. 75
Although at first glance the amendment may seem to bring about
sweeping benefits for the victims of drunk driving, the amendment also limits
slightly what is exempt from discharge. This limitation is found in the
wording "for death or personal injury, 7 6 thereby eliminating the possibility
of an exception to discharge for debts arising as a result of property damage
caused by a drunken or drugged driver. This wording indicates Congress'
intent to protect the victims of crimes, victims meaning those people who are
personally physically or mentally harmed by a motor vehicle driven by an
impaired driver, and not those sustaining only a financial or property loss.
IV. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDERS
In the same enactment that it passed the drunk and drugged driving
amendment, Congress also made certain debts for restitution imposed on
debtors who committed crimes nondischargeable in Chapter 13." Criminal
restitution orders were already nondischargeable in Chapter 7.7" Section
1328(a), which includes the list of nondischargeable debts in Chapter 13, was
amended to include any debt "for restitution included in a sentence on the
debtor's conviction of a crime. 09 The purpose of this enactment was to
"make civil and criminal restitution orders arising from actions brought by the
80
government nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
An earlier version of the amendment included provisions amending

section 362(b), making the automatic stay inapplicable to criminal restitution,
and section 523(a), making criminal restitution a general exception to
discharge. 1 These provisions, however, were not included in the final

75. Amendment, supra note 66, at 2, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4065, 4066.
76. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, § 2(a), 104 Stat. at 286, (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)).
77. Id. § 3, 104 Stat. at 2865, (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3)).
78. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986).
79. Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, § 3, 104 Stat. at 2865, (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3)).
80. Amendment, supra-note 66, at 7, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs
4065, 4071.
81. See 136 CONG REC. S8997-02 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (Presiding Officer
incorporating amendment no. 2103 without reading).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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amendment that was signed into law. The published Senate Report, however,
clearly states that criminal restitution orders payable to the government are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy, with no mention of the chapter under which the
petition is filed.82 The amendment purportedly has the effect of codifying
Kelly v. Robinson,8 which holds that criminal restitution orders are not
dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding, 4 and of overruling Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,8s which holds that criminal
restitution orders are dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding.
An amendment disallowing discharge of criminal restitution debts in
Chapter 7 under section 523(a) may not have been necessary considering case
law. In Kelly, the Supreme Court specifically held that section 523(a)(7)
included criminal restitution orders, thereby making restitution orders an
exception to dischargeable debts in Chapter 7V87 If this decision were wrong,
then Congress clearly would have clarified its meaning in section 523 when
making these amendments. Also, Congress certainly would not have
expanded the exceptions to discharge to Chapter 13 if it did not intend such
exception to exist in Chapter 7 as well.
The Kelly court based its decision making criminal restitution orders
nondischargeable in Chapter 7 partly on the historical treatment of restitution
orders in bankruptcy proceedings. The court noted that restitution orders have
generally not been dischargeable debts.88 The court also noted underlying
federalism principles, and expressed its reluctance for federal bankruptcy
courts to intrude on state criminal proceedings.89
The amendment regarding discharge of criminal restitution orders in
Chapter 13, however, apparently became necessary when the Supreme Court
decided Davenport. The court in Davenport holds that the exception to
discharge for criminal restitution orders did not extend to Chapter 13. 90 This
holding was based on a broad definition of "debts" and Congress' specific
limitation of dischargeable debts listed in section 1328(a).9 By amending

82. Amendment supra note 66, at 7, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4065, 4071.
83. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
84. Id. at 50.
85. 110 S.Ct 2126 (1990).
86. Id. at 2134. See Amendment, supra note 66, at 7, 1990 U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEWS 4065, 4065, 4065.; 136 CONG. REC. S8,997-02 (daily ed. June 28, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Levin).
87. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53.
88. Id. at 44-47.

89. Id. at 47-49.
90. Davenport, 110 S.Ct. at 2129.

91. 110 S.Ct. at 2133.
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section 1328(a), Congress has made its intention clear that criminal restitution
orders are not dischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings.
V. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEBTS
The bankruptcy laws were also affected extensively in another law
dealing with a popular political topic when the Crime Control Act of 1990
became law on November 29, 1990.' Once again, Congress chose to be less
forgiving to debtors by: i) adding debts for fraud in operating a financial
institution and debts for maliciously or recklessly failing to maintain the
capital of a financial institution to the list of nondischargeable debts in section
523(a); ii) by adding debts resulting from certain abuses of financial
institutions to those debts that may be satisfied from the debtor's exempt
property under section 522; and iii) by having a trustee in Chapter 11 assume
any capital maintenance agreements made by the financial institution. 3 These
amendments were enacted in response to growing savings and loan industry
94
failures and scandals.
The amendments add two new paragraphs to the list of nondischargeable
debts in section 523(a). The first new paragraph under section 523(a) prevents
discharge for any debt:
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent order
or decree entered in any court of the United States or of any State, issued
by a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any
settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of
fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed with
95
respect to any depository institution or insured credit union.
This amendment appears unnecessary when section 523(a)(4)9 is considered.
Section 523(a)(4) already disallows discharge of any debt "for fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."97
There is, however, a possible way to reconcile the two paragraphs, which

92. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990)
[hereinafter Control Act].
93. Id. § 2522, 104 Stat. at 4865-68.
94. These amendments "will ensure that those who defrauded [the savings and
loans] will be made to pay the price. This is a tough and effective answer to a
pressing national problem and it deserves the support of all Members." 136 CONG.
REC. H13,288-02 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
95. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(a), 104 Stat. at 4865 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(11)) (emphasis added).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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provide apparently similar provisions for the nondischargeability of debts
arising from fraud. This reconciliation considers section 523(c)" and its
amended provisions. 99
Section 523(o) grants the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the dischargeability of debts for fraud arising under section
523(a)(4) and requires the creditor to initiate proceedings to exempt such debts
from discharge."° The creditor must begin the proceeding to determine the
nondischargeability of a debt under section 523(a)(4) within 60 days after the
first date set for the meeting of creditors.' Section 523(c), and the burden
it places on creditors, does not apply to the new paragraph (11). Therefore,
a creditor claiming fraud under paragraph (11) would not have the burden of
initiating proceedings within 60 days to have the debt declared nondischargeable. The tradeoff, however, is that the creditor must have a "final judgment,
unreviewable order, or consent order or decree" for the fraud. 02 This
situation would presumably arise if the creditor, probably a financial
institution regulatory agency, missed the deadline to have the debt declared
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), but had a judgment for the debt that
arose from fraud and could therefore have the debt declared nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(11).
In addition, a new paragraph was added to section 523(c) which makes
it easier for the creditor to have the debt declared nondischargeable under
section 523(a)(4), and this declaration would lessen the need for a judgment
for fraud under paragraph (11). According to section 523(c)(2), when h
regulatory agency has taken over a depository institution, section 523(c)(1)
and the burdens it imposes on creditors does not apply unless the regulatory
agency was appointed in time to comply in a reasonable manner with the section.' 03

98. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988).
99. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(a), 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)).

100. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988).
101. 11 U.S.C. app. § 4007(c) (1988).
102. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(a)(1)(c), 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(11)).
103. Id. § 2522(a)(3), 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)).
The current section 523(c) is numbered paragraph (1), and another paragraph is added:
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a Federal depository
institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its capacity as conservator,
receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured depository institution, to recover
a debt described in subsection (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or (a)(11) owed to such
institution by an institution-affiliated party unless the receiver, conservator,

or liquidating agent was appointed in time to reasonably comply, or for a
Federal depository institutions regulatory agency acting in its corporate
capacity as a successor to such receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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A caveat, however, is necessary to this analysis. In the new section
523(c)(2), Congress says that section 523(c)(1)'04 will not apply to debts
described in subsections (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or (a)(11) unless the regulatory
agency has a reasonable time to comply with the requirements of section
523(c)(1)."0 Section 523(c)(1), however, does not apply at all to the new
paragraph (a)(11). This inconsistency raises the possibility that Congress may
have intended the new paragraph (a)(11) to be subject to section 523(c)(1),
apparently make paragraph (a)(11) redundant with paragraph
which 1would
6
(a)(4). 0
For the purpose of "fiduciary capacity," as used in the new paragraph
(11) of section 523, and in the traditional exception to discharge for fraud
while acting in a fiduciary capacity in section 523(a)(4), "an institution
affiliated107 party of a depository institution or insured credit union" will
qualify.

Another paragraph added to the exceptions to discharge does not allow
a debtor to discharge any debt:
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the
debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the
capital of an insured depository institution, except that this paragraph shall
which would otherwise be terminated due
not extend any such commitment
18
to any act of such agency.
This paragraph could also seem redundant, simply readdressing what is
covered in section 523(a)(6), which disallows discharge of any debt "for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property

to reasonably comply, with subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such
institution-affiliated party with respect to such debt.
104. Formerly 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988).
105. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522, 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. 523(c)(2)).
106. This argument could be supported, or refuted, by noting the other mistakes
in the drafting of these recent amendments, thus making an inference that Congress
intended to amend section 523(c)(1) but did not, or conversely that the inclusion of
(a)(11) in section 523(c)(2) was unintentional. See supra notes 40, 53.
107. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(e)). The definition for "institution-affiliated parties" is the
definition put forth in the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act,
with reference to section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(u)). Id. § 2522(e)(2), i04 Stat. at 4867.
108. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(a)(1)(c), 104 Stat. at 4865-66 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(12)).
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of another entity."'" The new amendment, however, may have significant
ramifications simply by including the word "or." Section 523(a)(6) uses
"and,". requiring the strict standard of having both a malicious and reckless
act. The use of "or" in the statutory amendment suggests a more relaxed
standard when dealing with federally insured financial institutions; the usage
requires only willful or malicious acts, but not both, for a debt to be exempted
from discharge.
With few exceptions, creditors with nondischargeable debts cannot fulfill
those debts by taking the debtor's exempt property.1
In an additional
effort to make financial institution insiders pay for their debts incurred in
mismanaging the institution, however, Congress gave creditors the right to
gain compensation from otherwise exempt property. Added to the exceptions
to the general rule that a creditor cannot go against exempt property are those
debts owed by an "institution-affiliated party" to a regulatory agency arising
from fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny, and
debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another.'
This
amendment is very important in states with large property exemptions,
particularly large homestead exemptions.1 2 Now the exempt property of a
person who looted a financial institution is not beyond the reach of the
creditors holding these debts even if the debtor files bankruptcy.
Capital, the cushion for the depositors of financial institutions, also
received a boost from recent changes in the bankruptcy laws. In a Chapter 11
reorganization filing, the bankruptcy trustee is now deemed to have assumed
any executory contract made to a financial institution's regulatory agency that
creates a commitment to maintain capital of the financial institution."13 This

109. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).

111. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(b), 104 Stat. at 4866 (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(3)). Section 522(c), listing exceptions to exempted property, is
amended by adding the following new paragraph:
(3) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(4) or 523(a)(6) of this title
owed by an institution-affiliated party of an insured depository institution
to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency acting in its capacity
as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for such institution.
Id.
112. For example, Texas has no dollar limit for a homestead exemption. TEx.
CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Supp. 1991).
113. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(c), 104 Stat. at 4866-67, (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 365(o)). Added to the end of section 365 is the following language:
(o) In a case arising under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be
deemed to have assumed (consistent with the debtor's other obligations
under section 507), and shall iimediately cure any deficit under, any
commitment by the debtor to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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removes the possibility of the holding company or shareholders filing
bankruptcy to avoid a capital maintenance agreement. Once an organization
or individual enters into a capital maintenance agreement, bankruptcy will not
provide an escape from complying with that agreement.
Moreover, any commitments to maintain the capital of a financial
institution are treated as an eighth priority claim, to be paid after distribution
to secured creditors but before any payments to general unsecured credi11 4
tors.
These amendments expand the ways to reach the assets of the savings
and loan and bank bandits who looted taxpayers by destroying insured
financial institutions; if the debts arise from fraud, embezzlement or larceny,
even exempt property will not be outside of the government's reach." 5
These amendments will "close off the bankruptcy escape hatch for bank and

Resolution Trust Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, or its predecessors or successors, to maintain the
capital of an insured depository institution, and any claim for a subsequent
breach of the obligations thereunder shall be entitled to priority under
section 507. This subsection shall not extend any commitment that would
otherwise be terminated by any act of such an agency.

Id.
114. Control Act, supra note 92, § 2522(d), 104 Stat. at 4867 (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)). Added to the priority list of section 507(a) is the following
paragraph:
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims based upon any commitment by the
debtor to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust
Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, or their predecessors or successors, to maintain the capital of an
insured depository institution.

Id.
115. Another possible result of these amendments is that regulatory agencies will
be able to use them to enforce net worth maintenance commitments obtained from
savings and loan holding company applicants. In pending litigation, the Resolution
Trust Corporation argues that the recent amendments expressly and implicitly
recognize that a net worth commitment can constitute an enforceable contract, and
therefore, the Resolution Trust Corporation seeks to enforce the contract as a third
party beneficiary. The other side maintains that the amendments have no application
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. See RTC Says Crime ControlAct Governs Tetco
Net Worth Maintenance Commitment, 56 BNA's BANKING REPORT 120 (Jan. 21,
1991); FederalCourts Refuse to Enforce Net Worth Maintenance Commitments, 10
BANKING EXPANSION REPORTER 2 (February 18, 1991) (both discussing Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Tetco, Inc., No. SA-89-CA-0847, (W.D. Tex. filed Dec. 14, 1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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thrift insiders whose acts of financial fraud and malice will end up adding
perhaps half a trillion dollars to the Federal debt.""' 6
VI. CONCLUSION
These changes in the bankruptcy laws will have wide ranging effects. No
longer are student loans dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding. No longer
are judgments from drug or alcohol induced automobile accidents dischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings. No longer are criminal restitution orders
dischargeable in Chapter 13. No longer can people who destroy federally
insured financial institutions use bankruptcy proceedings to avoid their
obligations to restore assets to the institution.
For such far reaching changes in the Bankruptcy Code, there was very
little planning by Congress. Indeed, the text and legislative history of the
enactments show no signs of empirical research, no signs of consultation or
input from the judiciary or the bar, and no signs of a general scheme to amend
and improve the bankruptcy laws. In fact, the areas that the amendments
address were enacted in completely separate bills, and the student loan
changes came from two distinct bills.
This lack of rhyme or reason suggests that these changes in the
Bankruptcy Code did not result from a calculated plan to alter the bankruptcy
laws, but rather were motivated by good public relations. Members of
Congress can now say that they are tough on deadbeats who do not pay back
their federally guaranteed student loans, that they are protecting victims of
crime, that they are aggressively fighting the war on drugs, and that the
savings and loan insiders are going to pay for the industry bailout before the
taxpayers have to pay one cent. The remarks made by Senators and
Representatives in support of the bills on the floors of Congress evidenced
these political motivations. For example, regarding the student loan changes,
Senator Grassley said, "this country is plagued with doctors, lawyers, and
other professionals who have
the ability to repay their student loans and other
17
debts, but prefer not to.'
The discussions about the drunk driving changes contained the most
political rhetoric. There were many compliments accorded Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD), who received credit, along with Senator Danforth,
for first proposing the amendments. 18 These compliments attest to the

116. 136 CONG. REC. 13,289 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Brooks).
117. 136 CONG* REC. 17,603 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).

118. E.g., 136 CONG. REC. S13,391 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
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lobbying power of MADD. Taking nothing away from MADD nor Senator
Danforth, and in no way discounting the severity of drunk and drugged
driving related injuries, n 9 these drunk driving changes in the bankruptcy law
were especially politically motivated. If Congress really wanted to help the
victims of crimes, and not just to respond to a public outrage over drunk
driving, it would have included judgments from intentional torts in the
exceptions to discharge of debts in Chapter 13 proceedings.120 As it stands
now, drunk drivers who injure plaintiffs cannot avoid the judgment rendered
against them by filing bankruptcy. Criminals, however, who intentionally
harm victims and cause severe injury can generally avoid a judgment against
them by filing bankruptcy.' 2' Neither group of perpetrators is deserving of
the protection granted by bankruptcy, and neither group of victims is more
worthy of the protection granted them by disallowing the discharge of one
debt and not the other.
The savings and loan changes also appear to be largely motivated by
political reasons. Banks and savings and loans have been failing at increasing
rates throughout the 1980s. '22 Now that the savings and loan fiasco is
topping the news, however, Congress has responded. When discussing the
financial institution changes, Representative Annunzio said:
[t]here are two things the American people want to see when it comes to
the crooks that looted the failed savings and loans. First, the American
people want to see the crooks in jail for their crimes .... The American
people also want to see the money the S&L crooks stole taken away from
the crooks. Every cent recovered from the crooks is one less cent that the
American people will have to pay as part of the savings and loan bail1
out. 2
With the possible exception of the student loan amendments, these
enactments appear to be based on political reasons, and not on a belief that

119. See Amendment, supra note 66, at 2, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4065, 4066 (noting that there were 23,352 alcohol-related highway deaths in
1988).
120. See Note, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: A Foolproof Mechanism for Avoiding
Payment of Civil Penalties Arising out of Criminal Conduct?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 803
(1991) (Although plaintiffs who receive tort judgments are small in number, their
judgments represent a significant dollar amount of debt in bankruptcy. T. SULLIVAN,
E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 294-96.).
121. But see In re LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, at D2, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sep.7, 1990,
at D1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 10, 1990, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
123. 136 CONG. REC. H6016 (daily ed. July 31, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/5
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people who can pay are using the bankruptcy laws to avoid paying their
debts."z Whatever the reason for these changes, they are now law. For
attorneys, the signal is to .be wary-the bankruptcy laws could change again,
and news headlines could signal the coming changes.
BRIAN C. FRIES

124. At least one recent empirical study, however, took issue with the notion that
the bankruptcy systerm is subject to abuse by people who are not really insolvent. A
statistical analysis showed that those who seek the protection of bankruptcy are indeed
the ones who should-insolvent individuals. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J.
WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 76-77.
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